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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Swensons object to Appellees' Statement of the Facts. The Appellees
have failed to cite to the record in support of any of their Statement of Facts, as required
under Rule 24(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the
Appellees' Statement of Facts should not be considered by this Court.
For example, Appellees claim, for the first time, in Statement of Fact No. 7,
that the vote commenced in December of 2003 and culminated on January 1,2004, while the
record clearly shows that the vote took place on January 1, 2004, from 12:00 p.m. through
2:00 p.m. (Rec. 15,34-36). Furthermore, the Notice of Termination filed on the property is
based on an alleged vote by the majority of owners on January 1, 2004; 42 for termination
and 3 against. This Notice of Termination, which is of record, is contrary to the un-cited
facts alleged by Appellees. (Rec. 33; and Addendum Ex. "C").
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COVENANTS WERE AUTOMATICALLY
RENEWED ON JANUARY 1, 2004.

Restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). The interpretation of contract terms is a
question of law. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Assoc, v. Wasatch City., 40 P.3d 1146
(Utah 2001). Unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written. It is the
court's duty to enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the

1

covenants.1 Holladav Duplex Mfg. Co. v. Howells. 47 P.3d 104 OJt.App. 2003); Freeman
v.Gee 423 P.2d 155 (Utah 1967).
While restrictive covenants forbid or require certain use of real property, they
also convey vested rights in those owners, who purchase their property when said covenants
are in place, and who desire to own property where such use is forbidden or such restrictions
are in place. One of the vested rights of those purchasing property subject to restrictive
covenants is also the method required to amend, change, or abolish the restrictive covenants.
Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition v. Rogers. 874 P.2d 818 (Okl.App. 1994).
The courts in reviewing restrictive covenants, with language similar to the
Restrictive Covenants at issue in this case, have held that any amendment (or termination)
must be voted on and ratified by the majority before the automatic renewal period
commences. City of Gulf Port v. Wilson. 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992).
According to the terms of the Restrictive Covenants, in this case, they were
automatically renewed for a successive 10 year period, commencing January 1, 2004.
Therefore, the Covenants were automatically renewed on January 1,2004 at 12:01 a.m.; and
any attempt to modify (or terminate) by a majority vote after the renewal period commenced
on January 1,2004 at 12:01 a.m., is not effective. Under the Covenants in this case, a new

!

It is the parties' intent that should govern. Furthermore, the fact that Swensons
may have asked the court to find that the Covenants were automatically renewed through
January 1, 2014, does not mean that the Swensons acknowledged, in any way, that the
power to terminate the Covenants existed on January 1, 2004. Such a vote would still
need to take place before the new renewal period commenced on January 1, 2014.
2

vote will have to be taken of a "majority of the then owners" at the end of the next 10 year
renewal period. See City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d295 (Miss. 1992) (wherein the
court held that where a restrictive covenant was automatically extended for successive
periods often years; and as in this case, when the covenants are silent as to when the vote
must take place, it was reasonable for the amendment to be voted on before the expiration
of the term, so that the covenant would not automatically renew for another ten years.)2 Cf.
Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393 (Ariz.App. 1995) (an amendment to
restrictive covenants approved during the running of an extension period would become
effective at the start of the next successive period); Pearce v. Scarcello, 920 S.W.2& 643
(Mo.App. 1996) (an amendment to a restrictive covenant made during the term by less than
a unanimous consent, became effective at the end of that term and not before); and Failla v.
Meaux, 237 So.2d. 688,689 (La.App. 1970)(amendment dated and recorded December 30,
1965 was effective. Had defendant waited until January 1,1966 to amend, the effective date
would not have been until the end of the next 10 year extension on January 1, 1976).
In this case, since the vote must be by a "majority of the then owners of the
building cites covered by these covenants," it is necessary that another vote be taken of the
"majority owners of building cites," at the end of the next ten year term.3
2

The court further stated that if the amendment was not already voted on and
ratified to go into effect on January 1, 1985, then the old covenant would automatically
renew on that date and go into effect for another 10 years. Id. at 300. There was no prior
vote or ratification in this case.
3

The Covenants, in this case, require a vote of the "majority of the then owners" at
the end of each successive 10 year period. The prior attempt to terminate the Covenants
3

The cases cited by the Swensons are not inapposite, but are on point, and
contain similar language to the Covenants at issue in this case. The case of Wallace's Fourth
Southmoor Addition v. Rogers. 874 P.2d 818 (Okl.App. 1994) actually supports the
Swenson's position. The court in that case did not allow an amendment of the restrictive
covenants, relying on the 10 year renewal term. The court stated, "[t]he clear reference to
'periods often years' would be meaningless if the covenant could be amended by majority
vote (less than unanimous) at any time on or after January 1, 1974." Id. at 821. (emphasis
added).
H.

THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DIRECT THAT
A VOTE TAKE PLACE ON JANUARY 1, 2004.

The trial court misread the Utah Supreme Court's statement in the previous
case of Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). The Utah Supreme Court stated
that the next time an amendment to the Covenants by a majority vote could take effect would
be on January 1, 2004. The Court did not rule that the vote, to effect such change, would
have to take place on January 1, 2004. Id. at 815.
Even the Defendants in filing for a Petition for Rehearing in the previous case,
recognized this long line of cases; and argued that if they met and voted on January 1,2004,
it would be too late, as the Covenants would already be automatically renewed for an

in October of 1997, more than seven years before the next renewal period was to
commence in 2004, was not a vote of "the majority of the then owners." The vote could
have been taken months or days before January 1, 2004, but the owners waited too long,
until January 1,2004, after the new renewal period had already commenced.
4

additional 10 year period.4 (Rec. 84, 105-106).
Therefore, based on the forgoing, even if this Court interprets the Restrictive
(
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maioritv vote did not occur until after the start of the next 10 year renewal period on January
1, 2004; the Notice of Termination filed on the property on March 26, 2004, should be
declared null and void.
CONCLUSION
The Restrictive Covenants were automatically renewed for another 10 year
period on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., therefore, the vote taken on January 1, 2004 from
1
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The Utah Supreme Court properly indicated that the next time that any change
could take effect based on a majority vote would be on January 1, 2004. The Court,
however, did not rule that the vote to effect such change must take place on January 1,2004.

new renewal period, is ineffective.
Based on the forgoing, the ruling of the district court should be reversed and
tint Nulin1 nil! iri/iTiiiiiatiuii lilrill iiiii KLiiiJIi "h, 'DIM, >lmuUI In. declareu ..

4

The Petition for Rehearing was denied. The vote at issue in Swenson 1 was taken
in October of 1997 more than seven years from the January 1, 2004, renewal date.
Therefore, it was not a vote of the "majority of the then owners" as of January 1, 2004.
However, the legal argument made by Defendants, that voting on January 1, 2004 to
terminate the Covenants would be too late, is still consistent with the law.
5
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DATED this J > 1 - day of June, 2005.
BOND & CALL, L.C.
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